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Abstract: In this paper, we establish a two way causality between the phenomenon of the 
infrastructure which is underused (the so called “white elephant case”) and the aggregate 
productivity level (TFP) of the economy. On the one hand, the fact that a transport 
infrastructure is not used so much as it could be is itself a cause of low TFP, because it 
represents a low productivity for an important item of social capital. On the other hand, low 
aggregate productivity makes firms strategies founded on large scale of production and 
exports more risky, given the possibility that the political decision to build the required 
transport infrastructure may never be taken. 
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Since SOLOW’s (1957) seminal paper, economists are well aware that a large share of labor 
productivity growth is not accounted by the increase in capital per worker, Hence its causes 
remain largely unknown so that they should be gauged by means of a statistical residual, the 
total productivity factor (henceforth TFP). It is widely agreed that this residual expresses the 
closeness of the economy to the technological frontier. This closeness is limited by the degree 
of efficiency in the use of capital stock at the economy level. 
The measure of TFP is far from exact since it relies on an estimate of total capital stock which is 
fundamentally not fully observable and it is often blended with aggregate productivity as 
technical progress appears to be embodied in new plant and equipment. Nevertheless, it 
appears that SOLOW (1957)’s residual is an important share of total economic growth. For 
instance, BURDA and SEVERGNINI (2009) estimate a proportion in TFP variation in the US case 
of about one third of total economic growth for the time period between 1994 and 2004. For 
less developed countries, this share appears to be even higher. NDULU (2006) deems that 
slightly less than one half of the economic growth differential between Africa in the south of 
Sahara and other developing countries can be accounted for by slow aggregate productivity 
growth. 
In some sense, the TFP concept is just a “measure of ignorance” of economic science about the 
causes and hindrances of economic growth. There were several attempts to overcome this 
ignorance, the more direct one was the generalization of the concept of “capital” along two 
broad directions: from “physical capital” to “human capital” (as in MANKIW, ROMER and NEIL, 
1992); and from “private capital” to “public capital” also labeled as “infrastructure” (as in 
ASCHAUER, 1989, and BARRO, 1990). While in empirical terms this generalization appeared to 
diminish the size of the Solow residual, it increased the degree of returns to scale in aggregate 
production at the theoretical level thereby confirming main assumptions of endogenous 
growth theory. 
The inclusion of public capital as a main growth factor covered two different types of inputs, 
namely the “physical infrastructure” (such as roads, railways, water distribution, power 
generation and distribution, telecommunications and so on) and the so called “legal 
infrastructure”. The latter type is related with the capacity that agents in an economy have to 
celebrate and enforce the contracts which govern transactions.  
A different approach was started by HULTEN (1996) consisting in approximating aggregate 
productivity through indicators of effectiveness of use of pieces of physical infrastructure. An 
ineffective infrastructure compels private firms to invest privately in complementary inputs, 
such as private power generators, thereby reducing their capacity to invest productively 
(REINIKKA and SVENSSON, 2002). 
Infrastructure such as roads can be ineffective either because it is in a bad condition due to 
poor maintenance, or because it is oversized on account of bad planning or overpricing (RIOJA, 
2003). In the latter case, they are usually labeled as white elephants. We will focus on the 
economic factors explaining the latter type of apparently “irrational” infrastructure provision. 
For this purpose, we will use the framework of development economics (ROSENSTEIN-RODAN, 
1947; MURPHY, SHLEIFER and VISHNY, 1989; KOHEI and TABATA, 2013), where each of a set of 
economic agents, who are tied by demand or cost complementarities, decides either to stick to 
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a “traditional technology” (small scale, constant returns, local sales only) or to switch to a 
“modern technology” (large scale, increasing returns, exports). 
Since, in standard development economics, the complementary agents are symmetric, the 
economy usually works as coordination game with two symmetric equilibria, namely the Big 
Push (all firms invest in modern technology) and the Poverty Trap (each agent sticks to 
traditional technology). Hence, the asymmetric outcome where the highway is built but the 
firms do not use it, thus remaining confined to local customers, can never arise in equilibrium. 
In order to allow for a white elephant equilibrium, we feature an asymmetric game where a 
political agent (the Government) decides whether to build a highway or not and a firm (or set 
of firms) decides whether to use the infrastructure or not. 
The fact that the Government is a player in this political-economic game, leaves us with the 
question of specifying its payoff function. While there exist many different forms of stating 
political payoffs in an exact theoretical form, it is hard to establish these kinds of behavior 
empirically. Furthermore, public choices in developing countries are often described in terms 
of “corruption” or “political sins”, whose aggregate rationality is hard to assess (see, among 
others, DAL BÓ and ROSSI, 2007; CHAKRABORTY and DABLA-NORRIS, 2011). Consequently, we 
opted to model this situation through an incomplete information game, where the 
Government has two types, namely a “builder/active” and a “non-builder/passive” type, which 




Some data on efficiency in highways use and total factor 
productivity across countries of the European Union 
 
For a subset of 24 countries in the European Union (the EU28, without Cyprus, Latvia, 




EU countries ,  Dens. Pop. ,  Dens. Highways ,  % TFP 2000-2004
Austria 99 2.0 1.0
Belgium 344 5.8 0.6
Bulgaria 70 0.4 4.0
Croatia 76 2.2 2.3
Czech Repub 131 0.9 6.3
Denmark 126 2.6 0.6
Estonia 29 0.3 6.4
Finland 16 0.2 1.7
France 111 1.
x y g ∆
8 0.5
Germany 225 3.6 0.7
Greece 84 0.9 2.3
Hungary 108 1.6 2.9
Ireland 60 1.3 1.7
Italy 195 2.2 0.4
Lithuania 45 0.5 7.8
Netherlands 394 6.4 0.3
Poland 122 0.3 3.0
Portugal 114 2.9 0.5
Romania 91 0.1 5.6
Spain 87 2.9 0.8






venia 99 3.8 1.9
Sweden 20 0.4 1.4










The meaning of the variables is the following: 
x  is the country population density, measured in People per 2Km  in years 2006/2007, 
according to Eurostat. 
y  is the density of highways within the country, measured in 1 Km of highway per 100 2Km    
of surface in the end of year 2011. The source is the European Union Road Federation 
Yearbook 2014 - 2015. 
g   is the country average annual growth rate in total factor productivity during the period 
2000 - 2004, according to BURDA, Michael and Battista SEVERGNINI (2009), "TFP growth in Old 
and New Europe", Comparative Economic Studies, 51: 447 - 466. The formula employed to 
measure TFP is the so-called "Solow-Törnqvist residual", which amounts to 
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In expression (2.2), the l. h. s. shows the relative variation in TFP between periods  1t −    and  
t   . In the r. h. s.,  , ,
t t
Y K  and 
t
N   stand for aggregate output, capital stock and employment 
in period  t   .  ( )
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tK
S  represents the share of capital in national 
income in period  t  . 
We estimate by OLS the equation 
 0 1y xα α ε= + +   (2.3) 
with the usual iid   assumptions on the error term. The theoretical expectation is that  1 0α >  
. Since highways provision should be driven by travel demand, it is expected to be directly 
proportional to population density. Indeed, the estimated structure is 
 ˆ 0.0949 0.0144y x= +   (2.4) 
This indeed a tight fit with  2 0.64R ≈  . The assumption that  1 0α =  can be rejected with an 
error smaller than 0.01 . 
We can measure the efficiency levels in the use of highways by travellers by calculating the 
negatives of the residuals of this fit. We label this variable as  z  . Observations of z  in EU 











































  (2.5) 
   
  
Then we calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient between variables  g    (TFP average 
annual growth rate in the period 2000 - 2004) and z (efficiency level in the use of highways). 
This coefficient is shown to be about  0.436  . It is different from zero in the significance level  
0.05  . 
A discussion about the meaning of the correlation between variables  g  and z  will be made in 






A model of association between highway use efficiency and total 
factor productivity 
 
The observed strong correlation between TFP and efficiency in highways use across most EU 
countries can be rationalized as deriving from a two way causality. On the one hand, highways 
are an important part of the aggregate capital stock and its specific productivity is included in 
the overall TFP accounting. 
On the other hand, to build many infrastructures in an economy characterized by low 
aggregate productivity will lead likely to the emergence of the so-called white elephants, i. e., 
public capital which will be barely used. In order to model this latter direction of causality, we 
present the following model, inspired by MURPHY et Al. 1989. 
We presuppose a spatial economy composed by two symmetric regions. In each one of these, 
a composite consumer good is produced by a fringe of small, competitive firms, under a 












  (3.1) 
We assume that each region contains n  identical consumers/workers with a demand function 
which is strictly decreasing in price and exhibits a unit constant price elasticity. Consequently, 





=   (3.2) 
where y  stands for the aggregate income of consumers in each region. 
As the firms producing the composite good are competitive, their profits will be zero in 
equilibrium. Furthermore, we assign specific values to parameters such that 
 1w p= =   (3.3) 
Since there is a positive transport cost for the composite good between the regions, each 
competitive firm can only sell to local customers thus refraining from any kind of export. 
Hence, this technological/geographical pattern will be labelled as “proximity to consumers”. 
In each region, we presuppose that one of the firms has the option to switch to an increasing 
returns technology, where it produces 1α >  units of composite good by employing 1 unit of 
labor as a unit variable cost and spending F  units of labor as a fixed cost. Therefore F  stands 
for a capital cost, and it comprises both physical capital (an equipment embodying a new 
technology) and “legal capital” (the cost of overcoming the public regulations and formalities 
which make any kind of industrial reorganization intrinsically difficult). The unique firm which 
switches to a modern technology becomes the most efficient one and it drives the competitors 




As MURPHY et Al. (1989) remarked, the firm which becomes a monopolist keeps unchanged 
the delivered price p  which it charges the consumers. Indeed, if it rises the price, it would be 
undercut and driven out of business by the competitors. It does not pay to decrease the price 
either, because it already sells to all consumers at price p  and the price elasticity of the 
demand for the composite good is one.  
For simplicity, we will also assume that the wage rate is not affected by the transition to a 
modern technology. The associated rise in consumers’ income is fully accounted for by the 
dividends which accrue to firm shares which are fully held by consumers. 
The degree of spatial concentration of manufacturing depends crucially on the availability of 
transport infrastructure linking the two regions which compose the country. The Government 
is a player in this game and it takes the political decision of either building a highway 
connecting the two regions or refraining from building it. In the former case, a firm with a 
modern technology can supply the other region through exports by incurring a positive but 
arbitrarily small freight expenditure per unit of output dispatched, ε . By contrast, if the 
highway is not built, transport costs across regions are prohibitive and the firm is able to sell 
only to consumers living in the region where it is located. 
If the Government builds the highway, and production is concentrated, the monopolist’s profit 
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By taking into account (3.3) and the fact that the transport cost between regions, ε , is 
arbitrarily small, the concentrated firm’s profit can be approximated by 
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  (3.4) 
Since a single modern firm supplies both regions, its profit should be equally shared by all 





= + = +   (3.5) 
By substituting y  from (3.5) in (3.4) and solving for π , we obtain the profit of a concentrated 
firm that exports to the other region in a situation where the Government takes the political 
decision to build a highway linking the two regions. 
 ( )2 1n Fπ α α≈ − −   (3.6) 
    
We deal now with the situation where there is productive concentration but each firm can sell 
only in its local market. This follows from the fact that the Government refrains from investing 
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Since consumers within each region hold the shares of the concentrated firm which operates 
there, the regional consumer income is 
 
 y nw nπ π= + = +   (3.8) 
 
Solving together (3.7) and (3.8), we obtain the profit of a concentrated firm if the political 
decision of building a modern transport infrastructure is not taken. 
 ( )1n Fπ α α= − −   (3.9) 
The working of this economy is featured here by means of a static game, where an economic 
decision is taken by a firm, which represents a set of productive units, and a political decision 
(either to invest or not invest in a transport infrastructure) is taken by the Government. 
As it was remarked in the Introduction, it is hard to assess empirically the rationality of the 
Government’s behaviour, which seems often to depend upon motives apparently not related 
with the political decision per se. This explains why many public decisions are described 
through terms such as “corruption” or “political sins”, particularly in developing countries. This 
reason led us to model this situation as an incomplete information game, where the 
Government has two types and exhibits a dominant strategy for its type. By contrast, the 
representative firm is profit maximizing and shows a single type. 
More specifically, the economic agents believe that the Government’s payoffs are, 
• δ , which takes values
( )
1 with probability 






 , if a highway is built. 
• 0 , if a highway is not built. 
 





11 11 12 12
21 21 22 22
Firm
Government Concentration Proximity to consumers
Build highway , 2 1 , 0
Not Build 0, 1 0, 0
a b n F a b
a b n F a b
δ α α δ
α α
= = − − = =
= = − − = =
 




This game may have different Bayesian-Nash equilibria, according to the way the parameters 
,  and n Fα  and the belief p  are specified. Here, we limit ourselves to the conditions where 
an underused transport infrastructure may arise, i.e. to the outcome resulting from the pair of 
strategies ( )Build Highway, Proximity to consumers . 
It is clear that a necessary condition for a “white elephant” to emerge is that is built in the first 
place, so that it is more likely when the belief p is high. However, this belief should not be too 
high because then firms would opt for “geographical concentration” and start using the 
highway to export consumer goods to the other region. 
An upper bound on the belief p  follows from the condition that, from the firm’s viewpoint, 
the expected payoff of “proximity to consumers” should not be lower than the expected 
payoff of “concentration”, for a given value of p . From payoff matrix (3.10), this means that 
 ( ) ( )11 21 12 221 1pb p b pb p b+ − ≤ + −   
Or, equivalently, 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 1 0p n F p n Fα α α α− − + − − − ≤         (3.11) 
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  (3.12) 
In order to interpret (3.12), we rewrite it in terms of the belief that the Government does not 
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  (3.13) 
It is clear that the r. h. s. of inequality (3.13) is an increasing function of α  (the “labor 







“capital intensity” of this kind of economy). Hence, by definition it is also a proxy of total factor 
productivity as it is given by SOLOW (1957)’s residual. 
The fact that highways are not so much used as they could be is per se a cause of low 
aggregate productivity, as an important piece of social capital exhibits a low productivity level. 
But the causal relation also runs in the other way. Indeed, as (3.13) shows, the domain of 
beliefs by the firm for which the conservation of a locally oriented strategy is a best reply 
decreases with the rise in aggregate productivity following from the adoption of modern, 
spatially concentrated technologies. 
A low initial level of aggregate productivity increases the riskiness for the firm of selecting 
productive methods which entail large scale production and exports and it strengthens the 
dominance for economic agents of strategies founded upon local sales. If the new transport 






We have seen that that a two way causality can be established between the phenomenon of 
little infrastructure use (the so called “white elephant” situation) and aggregate productivity. 
On the one hand, the fact that a transport infrastructure is underused is in itself a determinant 
of low TFP, because it represents a low productivity level for an important item of social 
capital. On the other hand, low aggregate productivity makes firm strategies founded on large 
scale of production and exports more risky, given the possibility that the political decision to 
build the required infrastructures may never be taken. 
Besides the above described kind of inefficiency, other sources of poor infrastructure on the 
supply side are common in developing economies, due namely to careless maintenance or 
management. Run down public hospitals and schools or underground networks in big cities are 
common examples in Southern European countries. It would be interesting in future research 
to assess the theoretical connection between these kinds of supply side inefficiency with the 
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